PATHWAYS OF HUMAN DIGNITY

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HUMAN AND CIVIC DIGNITY:
ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP

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I

The political discovery of human dignity

The condition of citizenship, in its fullness, is one of the highest achievements of modern civilization. When upheld, it entails the widespread recognition of the dignity of the human being, of any and all specific human beings. Many other achievements, from a universal access to education to the right to medical and health care and assistance, from the free expression of opinions, worship and thinking, to the equal right to participate in the polity, are derived from that core condition.

Citizenship has had a long and troubled history. No one would maintain today that citizenship, an ancient invention, has reappeared in the modern world after an unbroken line of subterranean transmissions between generations. Nor that, after a centuries-long silence, European classical

citizenship experienced a rebirth with the coming of modern times. Ever since Benjamin Constant sharply and convincingly distinguished between the 'liberty of the ancients' and that of the 'moderns'[1], we have learned to treat classical citizenship as substantially distinct from the modern kind. Though not only Thucydides (and through him, Pericles) and other Greeks, but also Cicero, had much influence on later thinkers, contemporary emphasis has been on a realistic distinction between the ancient world's more circumscribed conceptions of citizenship –where women, slaves, foreigners and others were excluded from it- and its modern expression. Rhe latter burst out openly and without too many ambiguities during two coetaneous modern revolutions, the American and the French, at the end of the 18th century. Historical rigour has induced us to emphasize difference and stress discontinuity.

This cautious approach often extends to those late medieval and Renaissance political theorists who did develop a proto-theory of modern citizenship. Some of us may feel inclined to consider this too strict in view of the considerable influence early modern political theorists -such as Machiavelli and Bodin- exercised upon their immediate posterity. This attitude becomes somehow untenable when we consider the extent to which their teachings about the nature of the body politic powefully influenced the thought of those who did elaborate the theory of the citizen destined to succeed in the modern world. Late medieval theories of the body politic as the secular home of free and sovereign men, under the rule of law, devoted to the public cause, are doubtlessly at the root of the republican conception of citizenship and the citizenry. Yet they ceased to be generally heeded once a much more individualistic conception of the polity prevailed, after Locke. A much stronger revival of that earlier republican tradition –which also found an echo during the English Puritan Revolution as well as in America and France during their own revolutions- had to wait until the late 20th century. Emphasizing fraternity (solidarity) and civic virtue rather than other basic elements of democracy, such as individual freedom, the republican, Machiavellian conception of the body politic lost much force during the long period of liberal hegemony in the West.

Despite all precedents, then, a single and robust historical current of continuous theorising about man as citizen cannot be identified. Nevertheless, from the Renaissance onwards, there arose a conception of political man as a citizen which influenced the full-blown version now known to us.

A theory of a universally shared dignity in all human beings having substantial political consequences, has its roots in some late Renaissance thinkers, such as the founders of *ius gentium* Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius. Yet, it was in the work of Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf where it was put forward in a manner which was bound to be decisive, duly re-cast, in the doctrines of the American and French revolutionists. Thus Hobbes' *De Cive* of 1642, assumed the universal political sovereignty of each and everyone, in other words, the universal political dignity of man, his or her capacity to share in the polity and to be the natural subject of rights. For Hobbes, however, the solution of the problem of order produced by his vision of an original state of generalized, and fragmented sovereignty (as a historical point of departure) had to find the well-known answer he was later

to develop in the *Leviathan* and in the *Behemoth*. The Hobbesian need for the sword and the obedience to a supreme sovereign, however, should not blind us to the fact that he built his political philosophy on the basis of a radical and universal conception of all men as free and equal subjects of rights.

For his part, Samuel Pufendorf, in his work *On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law*, published three decades later, in 1673, reached somewhat similar conclusions, since, as Hobbes, he starded from a theory of self-preservation. Unlike him, however, Pufendorf emphasized the general need for moral standards in human intercourse, not necessarily imposed by an all-powerful monarch or arbiter. He went further than Hobbes in his emphasis on the citizens' need for sociability and, especially, developed his immensely influential notion that to every right of the citizen there is a corresponding duty to the polity. Classical thinkers, from Cicero to Machiavelli, had given priority until then to the citizens' obligations to their fatherland or their polity, not to their rights. Later, the emphasis would shift to rights, especially in liberal thinking. Only much later, with the rise of of the welfare state, a balanced view of rights *and* duties –almost in the spirit of the by then nearly forgotten Pufendorf- would reappear. Neither Hobbes nor Pufendorf developed a truly liberal theory of the citizen, but both, in their similarly-named treatises, *On the Citizen* and *On the Duty of Man and Citizen*, established the theoretical ground for a universal consideration of all members of a political community as morally, and therefore, politically, equal and autonomous individuals, similarly entitled to be considered sovereign.

There is a subtle thread leading from the worldly, secular affirmation of man's dignity during the Renaissance –in Pico della Mirandola's 1486 *Oratio de hominis dignitate* or in Machiavelli's *Discourses* – to Pufendorf's vision of natural law, through the earliler efforts of Vitoria and Grotius to universalize that condition to all mankind. What had first been an ontological and moral discovery, to be philosophically asserted and explained, soon became a legal and political affirmation, with important consequences for a conception of society. Yet, no one thinker or school managed to find a viable solution. Hobbes' illiberal proposals seemed to negate his initial conceptions about the natural equality and humanity of all. Order, for him, mattered more that liberty. (In fact, whatever freedom was to be had, Hobbes thought, was a byproduct of order.) Others remained lost in a quagmire of good intentions based on the abstractions of natural law and on the innate sociability of human beings. Only the later and vigorous rise of liberal thought would eventually allow the establishment of a viable modern society based on a plausible theory of citizenship.

II

The one-dimensional citizen and the nation state

The history of the rise of citizenship both as a conception and as a legal and political institution has often been told. I shall not repeat it here. All that must be recalled in the present context is that, with John Locke arose a

theory of the citizen, destined to dominate the more democratic among the modern nations until the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. According to it, the citizen is not only the the subject of a state, but also a member of a political community. A citizen is any individual member of that community, in a given territory, and under one single constitution and government. As such, he or she is deemed to possess certain freedoms and substantial rights –such as the right to enjoy whatever goods and properties he or she legally owns, or to express whatever opinions the citizen wishes to make known. The attributes of that 'classical' condition of citizenship did not extend to other levels of the citizen's existence: she or he may be rich or poor, possess greater or lesser life chances in terms of education or work, or indeed gender.

The rise of this conception was simultaneous, if not preceded by, certain historical processes which, likewise, do not call for a detailed description here. Some democratic theorists themselves, such as Tocqueville, were keen to describe their social origin, and thus presented citizenship not only normatively, but also as a result of a historical process within a given civilization. Tocqueville showed how citizenship naturally arose out of the structures of North American colonial society, with its several immigrant collectivities, the pluralism of religious churches and sects, and the consolidation of self-governing communities at great distance from the metropolis. Citizenship was for them the common clay of a varied and plural society. He also showed how another polity, likewise made up of citizens, but with a quite different tradition, arose out of the previous undermining of the feudal order by the French monarch, the imposition of a single system of law, and other factors favourable to its development. The two conceptions of citizenship –the Anglo-Saxon and the French- were thus seen more as a result of distinct and alternative historical processes than as the consequence of abstract theories.

This sociological tradition –with its Tocquevillian roots- has continued until our day. Thus Norbert Elias saw the production of citizens as a part of the 'process of civilization', in which the establishment of good manners of social inercourse, no longer restricted to a caste or aristocratic class, played a crucial role. In the West, there has been a long historical trend which may be identified as the long 'sociogenesis' of the citizenry. Elias was not altogether explicit about the intimate relationship between manners and citizenship, but the causal connection is clear enough in his work. As is his more subtle analysis of the process of self-distancing (and its contrary attitude, 'engagement') which is an essential property inherent in a truly modern individual, that is, by definition, in a citizen. The individual citizen's personal aims and ambitions, privacy and intentions, can only be promoted under modern conditions. These allow him or her to distance himself or herself from tribe, caste, and class, and to mind his or her own business, untroubled by others or by the state. A *Gesellschaft* environment is necessary for citizens to thrive as such. *Gemeinschaften,* communities, may survive and even thrive in the modern world, with their intense personal commitments, loyalties and engagements, but only under the anonymous, egalitarian, impersonal rules of the *Gesellschaft* are truly modern citizens to be found. (Once again, the abyss that separates ancient citizenship from its modern version is once more, evident.)

The first citizens produced by the Western 'process of civilization', to make use of Elias' notion, were one-dimensional political animals. Thus, the new modern polity granted them a narrow though vital series of legal and political rights, which could be understood as one single set of possibilities. Citizens were one-dimensional political animals in the sense that certain other dimensions of their lives as members of society were not contemplated by the liberal and individualistic law of the land. The tensions created by this one-sided development of citizenship soon produced a massive critical reaction among those who discovered what were soon to be defined by the radicals on the left as the inner contradictions of the bourgeois dominated world, born out of the early development of liberal democracy.

Not only rich citizens or educated ones enjoyed vastly better life chances –in terms of class, status, and power- than poor, uneducated ones, but also the law itself often excluded the latter from the very status as citizens that the new liberal universe granted them as a matter of principle. Reformism, and the continuous expansion of the franchise in several key countries (that is, liberal and constitutional states) partly solved the problem. But not sufficently. The bitter criticism (anarchist, socialist and even radical liberal) against the 'bourgeois state' was directed towards the massive contradiction that was easily to be perceived between rights and real life chances. The Marxian critique of the democratic, industrial and bourgeois world, became the most rigorous and well-grounded, and also the most efficient, of all criticisms. In retrospect, we are able today to view very favourably the great moral depth of the invention of political citizenship as established in a period roughly covering the the years between the Glorious Revolution in England to the American and French Revolutions. Yet, it is also true that, as a one-dimensional conception, it remained manifestly unsatisfactory for many serious rational observers, belonging to very diverse schools of thought, not nonly marxism.

Some of the doctrines that, sooner or later, condemned one-dimensional citizenship wholesale, and saw no hope at all in its institutionalization in the modern polities –such as bolshevism or, later, fascism- were themselves bound to fall into the state of barbarism which would eliminate all possibilities of growth and evolution for the initial conception of man as citizen. In other words, totalitarian doctrines which complained about the poverty or emptiness of the (modern classical) conception of the citizen, were themselves to blame –and certainly not liberal philosophy- for the downfall of that, much superior, conception. They destroyed citizenship.

The socialist (and especially the Marxian) critique was well-grounded, but many of its followers continued to condemn the 'bourgeois state' even when it was decidedly reformist. Some even castigated, over many decades during the 20th century, all manner of socialist reformism as a treason to their principles or as an expression of 'collaboration with the class enemy' to recall the now stale language of the period. Such approach blinded a large part of the progressive or left-wing critique to the real possiblities for change embodied in the liberal conception.

The conservative, and at times, reactionary critique, was no less blind than radical thinking to the real limitations of classical, one-dimensional citizenship. Although Alexis de Tocqueville should not be included in the conservative tradition without qualifications, his initial analysis of some

pernicious consequences of democracy for the flourishing of truy free, creative and distinctive individuals are at the root of that critique. The highly influential theory of mass society (including the process of 'massification', the alleged rise of 'mass man', and the development of mass politics and mass culture) stemmed from the notion that liberal democratic society, though geared in principle to the institution of liberty and citizenship, produces in the end unfree, unimaginative and manipulable individuals. The theory was completed when José Ortega coined the expression 'mass man' and Karl Mannheim that of 'mass society', a decade before the Second World War. Its ramifications in several directions and its considerable intellectual authority and cultural influence would last for decades.[2] The conservative, disillusioned, interpretation of citizenship embodied in the mass society conception of modernity fuelled the skeptical mood prevalent among many analysts of the modern world. In the 21st century, it continues to inspire much criticism of crucial phenomena, such as the political culture generated by the mass media, which is seen as inimical to the consolidation of a free and responsible citizenry.

At one point the conservative doctrine of the degradation of the citizen into a mere 'mass man' crucially influenced and distorted the left-wing critique of modernity put forward by intellectual movements such as that of the Frankfurt school. Thus 'one-dimensional man' as described by an emblematic Frankfut school treatise -very widely read at a crucial moment of Western democratic discontent, in the sixties and early seventies- not only corresponded to the just-mentioned 'mass man' conception of the modern unfree citizen, but was also a charicature of the 'one dimensional citizen' prevalent till then at the political and legal levels. Norbert Elias' notion of the solitary *homo clausus,* also generated by late modern society, in the fullness of the modern civilization process[3] was another expression of the same malaise. The independent, assertive, creative citizen created by the liberal revolution had become manipulable, gullible, lonely and vulgar.

III

The multi-dimensional citizen

For quite a long time one-dimensional, or classical, liberal citizenship was circumscribed to a few countries. In America itself, liberal citizenship was still undergoing expansion in the 1960's, when blacks and other, formerly excluded people, were gaining access to voting and other rights in many areas. In Europe, Fascism in Italy and Germany, and Stalinst Communism in the East, wiped out citizenship for substantial periods of time, while countries such as Portugal, Greece and Spain reinstated it only in the 1970s. Its uneven expansion, both extensively and in depth, has nevertheless continued until the present day.

It was under the very pressure created by the obvious shortcomings of its traditional, one-dimenisonal version that citizenship grew in several directions. By so doing, It transformed itself into a far more complex political

and moral institution, more adequate to the dignity the human beings it was intended to uphold. It should be obvious, then, that critical analyses of liberal, one-dimensional citizenship, interesting though some of them were, failed to understand the potential and predict the historical transformation of the liberal one-dimensional citizen into a multi-dimensional one.

In 1949, T. H. Marshall was the earliest sociologist to view modern citizenship as a historical process, undergoing several stages of development, as it sank its roots in a few national societies. He argued that citizenship possessed three dimensions, civil, political and social. Legal institutions first protected civil citizenship –assuring the right to property and guaranteing some basic freedoms for many individuals. Political citizenship, for its part, grew apace with the development of democracy. Finally, social citizenship extended with the growth of the welfare state, which further integrated most citizens into the wider society by making education, economic opportunities, health care, and other services available to most people within each state. Contemplating the process from an essentially British perspective, Marshall saw in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries the three successive moments of that development.[4] His reflections meant the transition, within citizenship theory, from a one-dimensional to a three-dimensional conception of the citizen.

Much has been written about Marshall's seminal essay. Most criticism has accepted his 'developmental' interpretation while often refining his idea of the different stages, each wider than the former, through which citizenship has passed in a number of Western countries. Few have noticed that, as a welfare state theorist, he was too generous in his appreciation of the capacity of the liberal order to undermine social class all by itself. (Contrary to his main thesis, citizenship may, in some specific senses, generate new forms of class inequalty[5].) Despite Marshall's benign approach, with its considerable faith in the social democratic policies of British labour party post-war reformism, his approach unveiled a tendency that was by and large confirmed by the known facts in a number of countries.

In the early 21st century it is impossible to maintain that the historical process of the growth and unfolding of citizenship has been smooth or even similar in Western countries. In some of them, vigorous conservative attempts to reinstate a minimalist state, to rely entirely on market forces, and to revert to 'civil' and 'political' citizenships at the expense of a 'social' citizenship -in the United States, Great Britain and in a few other countries-, suceeded for some time in arresting the further development of economic redistribution and social justice through the welfare state, though never in dismantling it. Other countries –in Eastern Europe- had already enjoyed a noticeable development of welfare provisions and social equality measures under Soviet dictatorships, and only later were able to enjoy the civil liberties and political advantages of liberal, or even civil, citizenship. In other words, the process varied everywhere. Not only it did not always follow the Marshallian sequence, but in some important cases, it even followed a reverse path. (To complicate things further, welfare states differed from each other in many ways, something which has inspired exercises, often more scholastic than really enlightening, in public welfare taxonomy.)

Without wishing to enter into a discussion of the several waves of citizenship expansion, a considerable degree of consensus seems

established around the notion that a fuller institutionalization of citizenship in a modern democratic society today entails, at least, (a) a set of legal rights: personal security, freedom of expression, equality before justice, rights of property according to the law; (b) another set of political rights, such as voting rights, or the right of political representation; (c) certain so-called social rights, represented by pensions, health care, and subsidies from the public services to the citizens in need of them; (d) participation rights, as established by law, in citizens' councils, industrial *Mitbestimmung*, and other circumstances, in which diverse stake holders have a right to express themselves, and voice their legitimate needs; (e) ethnic or other community rights[6], from aborigines in Australia and North American Indians to European stateless nations –or even strongly distinct regions- within the European Union of nation states, (These collectives, historically, linguistically, or otherwise defined, demand recognition in strict terms of citizenship into the larger political community.) The basic kinds of rights (and corresponding duties, such as military service, tax obligations, attendance to school, and others) could of course be grouped differently.

By looking at the diverse criteria available today in the literature, one may perhaps accept that there can be identified, essentially, five sufficiently distinct kinds of citizenship rights and duties: legal, political, solidary, communal and cultural.

(a) *Legal rights,* correspond to what is often discribed as 'civil' rights. They cover rights such as as privacy and ownership, and establish duties such as the payment of taxes.

(b) *Political rights*, not only include the traditional rights of voting, public demonstration, and running for office or holding it, but those of promoting social movements in civil society –besides parties- to reach legitimate aims.

(c) *Solidary rights* are those which allow fraternity to flourish. The right to receive help from the public sphere –the state- is one of them, as is the right of citizens to organize in favour of the common good, or of any issue that they freely deem necessary to confront for the common good and general interest of the people.

(d) *Communal rights* are those which allow members of a social unit to participate the decisions that affect its life and orientation. Collective bargaining between employers and employees, councils of urban dwellers, again, *Mitbestimmung* in the corporation or the enterprise, are examples.

(e) *Cultural rights.* Ethnic, language, belief and other cultural rights within a plural society need not be in opposition and contradiction to the universalistic orientation of citizenship. Citizenship is the guarantee that the citizenry may group in any form they wish as long as that is not harmful to the common good.

IV

Advanced citizenship and the republican citizen

Republicanism is a conception of the political community which has very old historical roots. Yet, it is only relatively recently that a number of theorists as well as many concerned citizens, have made substantial efforts to consolidate it as an alternative to other democratic conceptions of the polity. The proponents of republicanism have sharply distinguished it from most forms of communitarianism, on the one hand, and from mainstream liberalism, on the other. Further distinctions, as between republicanism and traditional democratic socialism, have also been drawn up.

An account of contemporary republicanism is not called for in the present context[7]. It shares some features with liberalism[8] (the emphasis on personal freedom and individual initiative first and foremost) though fewer with communitarianism. Its main emphasis is both upon fraternity, or solidarity - hence its proximity to redistribution and social justice) and upon its vision of the citizen as a participating, active political animal, inspired by a certain degree of civic virtue and a sense of responsibilty for the common good, as developed in the public sphere or *res publica*[9], by a process of civic deliberation. These elements are essential for a republican conception of the good society.

What is striking about this conception, over and beyond any sympathy (or indeed, antipathy) anyone may feel towards it, is its affinity to the mature, multi-dimensional interpretation of the modern citizen. I would not go so far as to claim that all friends of the just-described 'advanced' or mature citizen are implicit and unconscious republicans. I limit myself to point out the 'elective affinities' that exist between the two, that is, between doctrinal or theoretical republican citizenship and what may be called a fuller, or advanced, citizenship. The latter's demands for the implementation of solidary rights and and policies, especially towards those who are underprivileged or 'precarious' citizens, for instance, coincide with those of republicanism[10]. The same can be said of its emphasis on participation rights –in industry, communal life, the public conversation and the political sphere. These coincidences are undeniable facts. The burden of the proof that they are not so is not for republican theory. It is those who are skeptical about the intimate links between republicanism and advanced, multi-dimensional citizenship, who must show that they are separate and wholly independent from each other.

There may be elements in republican theory or, to be more precise, in some of the schools of thought into which republicanism may be divided, which are irrelevant to such affinities: constitutional patriotism –in sofar as it is a republican attitude- and civic patriotism soon come to mind. Yet there are others wich are crucial to both advanced citizenship and republicanism that warrant the 'convergence' position adopted here, which sees the rise of advanced citizenship and republicanism as intimately linked, indeed, mutually dependent.

The common ground between theoretical and actual, real-life advanced republicanism extends to another feature. Both advanced citizenship theory and republican practices in modern democracies consider that rights and obligations are the result of conflict. Both stem from a 'conflict theory position'. For the advanced conception of citizenship, certain rights may exist as the 'natural rights' of human beings as citizens, but all rights are also understood as conquered. Rights are implemented only after battles, vindications, claims and

counterclaims have generated them in a given political community. From the electoral franchise of the working and lower classes to the incorporation of all races into de body politic, or that of women, and later, of several significant minorities (homosexuals, for instance) all rights and corresponding duties, stem from social, cultural, political and economic movements[11] and their corresponding struggles. Rights may stem from abstract principles in some significant cases but they are always the result of history, of human beings in action, frequently against each other or struggling over scarce or restricted goods. Rights are rights won. Emancipation, freedom from domination, equality, moral recognition are all historical victories, not always easily won. In some democracies struggles involving rights of citizenship have led to civil wars, in others, conquered civic or political rights have been the outcome of very serious efforts by different social movements involving a fair amount of violence. (The black people's right to gain access to all public spaces, the women's vote, equal pay for women and men, are just three well known examples). In some cases revolts against exclusion from rights have been fairly bloodless and yet also very tense and protracted. From Australian aborigines to American Indians (both in North and South America) incorporation of so-called indigenous peoples into the wider democratic polity has been a result of a struggle or a series of struggles. Slavery was not abolished without the abolitionist movement that preceded it. Caste in India was eroded only as a result of a struggle for national independence and citizenship.

Occasional coincidences of republican universal citizenship with other doctrines –either communitarian or liberal- should not blurr the picture. It would be pretentious to claim that there are no areas of overlap between the three great interpretations of contemporary democracy, liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism. Yet whatever the common ground shared with other orientations, republicans, as conflict-oriented theorists –though certainly peace loving democrats- have stressed more than anyone else the conflict component in the constitution of liberty.

Civic virtue itself must be understood as a result of a political socialization process in which demands for a certain amount of public moral restraint on the one hand combine with demands for active participation in public life, on the other. The latter can only be fulfilled if a considerable number of citizens are active, not passive, members of the polity. Republicans do not imagine their citizens to be saints. Hence the measured, circumscribed sense in which the notion of civic virtue, responsible participation in the public realm, is used in their langage. By the same token, however, active ('virtuous') citizens can be neither fanatic militants nor professional party members. Many social movements, altruistic organizations and civil society associations are, in this sense, implicit republicans[12]. So are many of those who voice their critical opinions with due independence, or who seek to participate into deliberative democracy, or at least to participate and have their voice heard in the public debate.

There hides, in the assertion that voluntary associations in civil society are a dimension of republican practices, no desire whatsoever to reduce and assimilate the so-called 'Third Sector', non-lucrative sphere, now so powerfully significant, into contemporary republicanism. Yet it would be quite wrong for republican theory to take any serious distances from it. For republicanism, civic altruism is of the essence. An affinity with voluntary associations altruistically

oriented towards solving certain social problems and the lessening social evils in the public sphere is an obvious feature of republicanism. Such voluntary associations involve the public practice of civic virtue. They are not party-political, but they represent the presence of the private in the public sphere. Non party, public concerns which manifest themselves in altruistic action are thus an expression of civic virtue[13]. The fact that most are far from morally perfect, or that some lend themselves to the enticements of corruption, political manipulation or slackenss in their alleged dedication to altruism does not invalidate this assertion. Above all, a republican view of advanced citizenship is neither utopian nor naïve. It measures the quality of democracy by the presence of altruism, solidarity and good public behaviour in a given polity but, once again, does not equate civic virtue with saintliness.

The rise of advanced, multi-dimensional citizenship has gone hand-in-hand with cetain forms of peaceful civil society activism, precisely because rights are won, and civil and other rights are created and developed through struggles, many of them, fortunately, highly civilized, though certainly not always easy for those involved in them.

The growth of advanced citizenship has not been smooth anywhere. Moreover, its full consolidation has also encountered serious difficulties, even in those countries whose democratic political order, constitution and culture seemed to be most favourable for its flourishing. Class inequality, the 'corporate society', mass politics through media manipulation are just three of the obvious contemporary foes of republican citizenship. None of those forces are sufficient to completely arrest the consolidation of full citizenship in its tracks, but no critical account could be complete without reference to them.

(a) The structure of society entails that there is, in parallel, a social structure of freedom and a social structure of citizenship. The dialectic between class (a main feature of social structure) and citizenship is not straight forward, or zero-sum. The consolidation of a society of citizens, by itself, also allows the growth of new social classes and privileges, if it is not accompanied by fair but vigorous redistribution policies. Laissez faire policies, by themselves, may foster the growth of new barriers of privilege.

(b) The rise of a corporate society –bureaucratization, corporatism, the predominance of firms, trade unions, monopolies, oligopolies- breeds a vast network of organized interests that openly run counter to the agile, fluid and open nature of a society with a minimally empowered citizenry, based on a minimum of deliberative and solidary practices. The democratic deficit from which a number of societies suffer stems to a large extent from the disproportionate role played by lobbies and organized interests in the public decision process.

(c) Mass culture and the mass media add a new dimension to the public sphere, the arena where a truly deliberative and republican democracy may flourish. The manipulation of public opinion and the simplification of complex issues by the media are one of the great challenges facing the progress of a free, conscious and well educated citizenry.[14]

These developments are serious hindrances to the consolidation of a truly advanced citizenship. Admitting their enormous power and influence will allow any pessimist to consider that the future of full citizenship is a dark one. Yet, the admission of the equally powerful trends towards the growth and deepening of citizenship –at least in key regions of the world, such as contemporary Europe- is also based on hard evidence[15].

The task of the analytical observer is to study the arena on which the complex struggle now takes place between a vibrant, demanding and democratic citizenry and the contemporary forces that lead to new forms of domination and unfreedom.

V

Cosmopolitan Citizenship and its Discontents

Citizenship is expansive. First confined to the nation state, it progresively sank its roots among all the members of the political community, incorporating into it class after class, region after region, profession after profession, in a process which was neither smooth nor easy nor identical for each element involved. It has also undergone a more than incipient process of internationalization. The notion itself of 'citizen of the world', once utopian, has been increasingly taken seriously.

More often than not, the trend towards an always wider citizenry has also eroded linguistic, racial or cultural communities. It also, inevitalby, generated bitter resistances to laws and measures which were often unfair and occasionally cruel to each distinct community affected by such expansion. The deviations and aberrations of forcefully imposed republicanism (from 17th century Puritanism and French revolutionary Jacobinism to 20th century Stalinism) are well known, unpalatable memories. (In fact, they entailed the obliteration of genuine republicanism itself.) The history which has led to the incipient establishment of advanced citizenship dawning today is not entirely pleasant.

The modern expansive wave of citizenship has not stopped at the borders of the original states in which it was born. It has begun to overflow old frontiers. This already began to happen when citizenship was still sinking its roots within its own polities, when it had not yet completed its course within them. (Many blacks in America, for instance, were still fighting for their rights as citizens in the 1960's and the abolition of *apartheid* in South Africa came much later; while in Europe, as mentioned earlier, some countries, Portugal, Greece and Spain, definitely freed themselves from dictatroship only in the mid 1970's. In the early 21st century important ethnic minorities in Western Europe –France, november 2005- were angrily expressing their frustration at the lack of *de facto* recognition as full citizens.) Examples could be multiplied. The final outcome of the trend still remains uncertain, so that the prediction of an unstoppable current

of democratic incorporation into citizenship –both inside and beyond state borders- cannot possibly be made with complete confidence. Not only traditional barriers are still in place in many countries but also hindrances to a much fuller citizenship for certain categories of citizens do not seem to weaken.

Nevertheless, the transformation of national into cosmopolitan citizenship is not just a pious thought or, as in its early formulations –from St Augustine to Immanuel Kant and to Karl Marx- a well-argued moral and philosophical ideal. Current globalization trends entail modifications and reformulations of institutions of democratic governance such as citizenship[16] in the direction of transnational laws, regulations and provisions. Moreover, the realization that the national state no longer can be considered as the perfect guardian of the rights of its own citizens has generated, especially in the decades after the Second World War, a series of movements towards the denationalization of citizenship and the consolidation of a truly cosmopolitan citizenship, grounded on a conviction that civil rights are universal, not bounded by the limits of caste, faith or race. United Nations declarations of universal rights were a turning point in this process, and so was the creation of the International Court of Justice at The Hague in 1945. The same can be said of the establishment of singificant though unofficial international tribunals of human rights, stemming from civil society initiatives, and the creation and constant growth of respected citizens organizations such as Amnesty International.

To be certain, the transnational protection and defence of rights ought not to be confused with civic participation, active citizenship and the rights of members of cultural or ethnic communities to be recognized as such. They are essentially different, but they are also closely related to each other. The one presupposes the other. Active, multi-dimensional, cosmopolitan citizenship cannot thrive without the proper institutional legal, sufficiently denationalized framework.

The growth of cosmopolitian citizenship is still incipient. Yet, its progress is also undeniable. We do not know whether it will fully flourish in the end: there are too many difficulties in its path. Yet, in several parts of the world, not least in contemporary Europe, it has made substantial progress. Even in that part of the world, in the Balkans, neotribal warfare and ethnic-religious hatreds unleashed the fury of fratricidal warfare at end of the 20th century. Hideous crimes against humanity were commited. Today, powerful democratic nations, under the fear of fanatical terrorism, behave undemocratically abroad and violate basic human rights. Echoes of the imperialistic and undemocratic misbehaviour of the Athenians toward other sister democratic city states during the Peloponnesian War have not died out. This tragic contradiction, forever recorded for us by Thucydides, has been repeated in our own time. Under such conditions the flourishing of world fraternity and world citizenship seem very hard to achieve. They look perilously like the once distant abstractions of Kant's plans for a perpetual peace among civilized peoples. Peoples made up of citizens, not vassals.

The contemporary process towards an ever wider citizenship –cutting across countries and communities- should not hide certain problems arising, paradoxically, from the very rise of a possible fullness or plenitude of the condition of being a citizen. The uncomfortable truth is that, in the history of human society, sometimes the achievement of important societal goals does not occur without the production, by that sheer fact, of damages and evils

generated by its success. I shall avoid the more philosophical question whether this should always be necessarily so, in order to point out only the issue at hand: that of the possible and foreseeble dysfunctions produced by the hypothetical achievement of a full, multi-dimensional, and to a large extent, internationalized, citizenship.

Perhaps the current and welcome proliferation of citizen's rights, entitlements and attributes being slowly extended to the entire citizenry –though unevenly and certainly not in all countries- may lead to a situation in which a new, unexpected, turning point in the history of citizenship is reached. Historically, the fullness of any civilizational process –be it feudalism, monarchical absolutism, communism, or any other political order- has always led to a serious crisis of the system. My own suspicions about this hypothetical reversal of fortunes cannot be developed here. Especially considering that so much is still to be done till the poor, the downtrodden, the socially disadvataged and the unfailrly excluded are duly integrated into the international community of the free and equal[17]. Yet, the consideration of the possible future difficulties created by the 'plenitude' of a full citizenship under the inflationary weight of its own critical mass of duties and obligations and rights, may one day is not an idle philososphical exercise.

All we may witness today, in the midst of current difficulties, is some palpable progress towards effective cosmopolitan citizenship. Its supporters have become more sophisticated in some respects. Thus, while subscribing to the universalism which is inherent in any notion of multi-dimensional citizenship, they have realized that it does not necessarily have to be inimical to certain expressions of communitarianism. Human beings cannot live without communtarian ties. (Even the thinkers of the brotherhood of man, of the universal rights of all human beings, and the desirable and necessary denationalization of citizenship, see themselves as members of the community of humankind, of an ideal species of detribalized rational animals[18].) For many, the extension of citizenship has not meant their moral and political incorporation as equals into a civilized polity, but rather their assertion of tribal or communal difference. When the assertion of difference does not threaten the integrity of the polity nor its democratic functioning, all seems to be well and good. However, when certain communal entitlements and specific rights undermine such integrity with a neo-particularistic conception of citizenship the claims and principles of the universalistic concepton become weakened. The tragic paradox is this: under the conditions of advanced modernity, universalistic principles are sometimes invoked by certain particularistic interests that, in so far as they succeed, undermine citizenship.

I do not wish to end on a pessimistic note. I would only like to recall the fact that certain historical processes tend to transform themselves, when reaching a stage of 'plenitude', into their opposite phenomena. (Charisma, for example, when suffering diffusion and routinization may generate bureaucratization and, certainly, secularization[19].) We must at least be aware that the historical moral victory that represents the triumph of citizenship –in a limited number of countries and even there never complete- will bring with it new discontents, unexpected dysfucntions, unsuspected difficulties. They will require added efforts of imagination and courage, for the situation, tomorrow, will be more subtle and intricate than it was until today. There will not always be easy battles to be won, with clear-cut battle lines between the foes of equality

and freedom on one side, and the friends of universal citizenship and the equally universal respect for human dignity, on the other. The task that lies ahead will be more arduous than it has been hitherto.

NOTICE

This essay develops the ideas presented at a conference organized under the auspices of the Union Académique Internationale*, at Rabat, Morocco, in June 2007, on the subject of 'La dignité de la personne humaine', and developed in 'Dignidad Cívica', published in* Claves, *no. 173, June 2007, pp. 4-16. Both texts were based on 'Paths to Full Citizenship', in P. Foradori, S. Piattoni and R. Scartezzini, eds.* European Citizenshp: Theories, Arenas, Levels, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007, Chpater I. pp. 19-34.

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NOTES

1 Constant, B. 'De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes', 1819, in Constant, B. (1980).

[2] For a detailed account cf. S. Giner (1976)

[3] N. Elias (1978) pp.119, 125, 130-132, 135.

[4] T.H. Marshall (1973)

[5] S. Giner (1987) pp.79-136

[6] For current classifications, cf. E.F. Isin and B.S. Turner, Eds. (2002) Chapters 2, 4, and 6.

[7] Many are available. Cf. S. Giner (1998)

[8] Cf. R. Dagger (1997).

[9] '*res publica*' in the old Ciceronian sense of public sphere or 'matters of common concern' for all citizens, not in the modern sense of 'republlic'-

[10] L. Moreno (2000)

[11] Turner, B. (1986)

[12] S. Giner and T. Montagut (2005)

[13] I have called it *lo privado publico* ,cf. S. Giner (1994); for a Italian equivalent, cf. P.P. Donati '*il privato sociale*' in P. Donati and I. Colozzi (2004)

[14] There is a dearth of republican theory facing the problems posed by mass culture and the mass media for the practice and advancement of civic virtue or advenced citizenship.

[15] This very book is devoted to the exploration of these problems.

[16] J. Brodie (2004)

[17] S. Giner (2005)

[18] *Pace* arguments to the contrary, such as M. Walzer (1994)

[19] Cf. S. Giner (2003); E. Shils (1975)